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and Jan Knippers Black A drama that unfolded last summer in Peru and Panama has brought to
light what appears to be yet another clandestine network for shipping arms to the Nicaraguan
contras. The cover began to unravel as a Danish ship called the Pia Vesta made its way toward
Peruvian waters in early June 1986. The story of the Pia Vesta, as pieced together from accounts
in the Peruvian magazine CARETAS and other print and broadcast media around Latin America,
tends to confirm and flesh out the July 18 report by the WALL STREET JOURNAL that the National
Security Council's Lt. Col. Oliver North had arranged to supply the contras with arms purchased
from Eastern Europe. The ship, owned by Joergen Jensen's Vesta shipping company of Svendborg
and chartered by SA-Chartering APS of Copenhagen, left the East German port of Rostock on
May 5 loaded with 200 tons of weapons and 32 military trucks. The commercial transaction was
carried out by the East German state enterprise in charge of foreign trade and Sinato International,
Inc. The cargo manifest listed Marnix, S.A. of Montevideo, Uruguay as the shipper. According to
a bill of lading dated April 30, the cargo was to be received by the Peruvian Navy at the port of
Callao. On June 3, as the Pia Vesta transited the Panama Canal, SA- Chartering APS sent a telex
to the Peruvian company Universal Maritima, S.A. requesting that the company serve as its agent
when the ship arrived in Callao. The telex named Orestes Aliaga Zegarra, an employee of the
state port authority, as the representative who should claim the cargo. But Aliaga, who received a
similar telex, said he knew nothing about the matter. Universal Maritima asked that Copenhagen
Chartering, in compliance with Peruvian law, forward the commercial documents itemizing the
ship's contents. Copenhagen replied that Aliaga had the documents. But he did not. Finally, on
June 6, having received no documents, Universal Maritima informed Pia Vesta Captain Johannes
Christensen that it would not act as the ship's agent in Peru. Meanwhile, as reported July 7 and
August 18 by CARETAS, CIA officials in Lima, apparently unaware of the real mission of the Pia
Vesta, alerted the Peruvian government to the approach of a ship bearing what they took to be
contraband arms. President Alan Garcia, assuming that the arms were destined for Peru's "Sendero
Luminoso" guerrillas, responded by ordering the Peruvian Navy to find and capture the ship. As
the Peruvian Navy, with Air Force assistance, began its search, Copenhagen Chartering issued an
order to the Pia Vesta, an order re-transmitted from radio WON of the United States, to turn around
and head back to Panama. President Garcia then turned to the Panamanian government. Speaking
personally with President Eric Arturo del Valle and with armed forces commander Gen. Manuel
Antonio Noriega, he asked that the Pia Vesta be intercepted and its cargo confiscated. Responding
within hours, on June 13 Noriega informed Garcia that the Pia Vesta had requested permission
to dock in Panama, but at a US naval base. The Panamanian military intercepted the Pia Vesta on
June 14. Maj. Luis Carlos Samudio reported on Panamanian Televisora Nacional five days later
that as their patrol boats approached, Pia Vesta crew members were trying to throw boxes into
the sea. The bill of lading turned over to Panamanian officials showed only rolling stock and spare
parts. But the containers once unsealed revealed 1,500 rifles, 1,500 RPG missile launchers, a large
amount of ammunition, and 32 military vehicles. Interviewed Aug. 9 on Peruvian television, Gen.
Noriega commented that the Pia Vesta was equipped with a very sophisticated communications
system. The ship's manifest seized by Panamanian authorities said the cargo was to be delivered
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to the commander-in-chief of the Salvadoran armed forces, Gen. Adolfo Blandon, c/o Terminales
Chiriqui, S.A. of Panama. The cargo, however, was not identified as military. Gen. Blandon denied
knowledge of such a shipment. He was quoted by AFP on Aug. 18 as saying, "It would be illogical
for Russian weapons to be destined for El Salvador." As the ship was being intercepted, Panamanian
authorities arrested a Peruvian, Emilio Ortiz de Zevallos, whom they believed to be awaiting the
cargo at the port of Balboa. While in custody, Zevallos placed a call to a man named Duncan Davis
in Miami. Interviewed by CARETAS on July 31, Davis said that his company, General Equipment,
headquartered in Miami, handled more than $3.6 billion worth of arms sales on a yearly basis, and
that the cargo confiscated from the Pia Vesta, for which he assumed full personal responsibility, was
worth $2.5 million. CARETAS reported Oct. 6 that Davis had done business in the past with Gen.
Blandon. During Zevallos's conversation with Davis, a conversation recorded by the Panamanian
military and published in the Panamanian newspaper LA REPUBLICA on August 17, the two
men were joined direct from Lima by Alberto Coppo Gayoso, a Peruvian businessman who had
previously worked with a secret police force in Peru. CARETAS revealed on Oct. 6 that Coppo
Gayoso had paid a commercial agency, RESA, to issue false documentation showing that the Pia
Vesta had arrived in Callao and then returned to Panama en route to El Salvador. Next, reference
was made during the telephone conversation to Eldon Cummings, a retired army colonel, who
headed the US Military Assistance Group in El Salvador in 1980. Cummings later worked as an
aide to Nestor Sanchez, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs. Sanchez has
been reported as having been involved in the contra supply network on numerous occasions by
the US media. In July, the Peruvian government, noting that such trafficking in illegal arms might
well affect its security, launched an investigation and lodged some protests. A diplomatic note
requested from the US government its assistance in determining the role played by Duncan Davis
in the Pia Vesta affair. The German Democratic Republic was asked for complete information on
the cargo and for an explanation as to why it consented to the transaction without checking with
the Peruvian government. The East German government responded that its own foreign trade
company may have been misled by the Swiss company VUFAG. VUFAG, the East Germans said,
had presented itself as representing the commercial interests of the Peruvian government. In fact,
according to CARETAS (Aug. 18) VUFAG was a front organization for Duncan Davis. The Peruvian
government, dissatisfied with that response, recalled its ambassador from the GDR. Meanwhile,
Peruvian missions in Panama, Denmark, France, Switzerland, and Uruguay had concluded that
documents found on the Pia Vesta were forged and that none of the companies mentioned in
those documents existed. A report issued by the Peruvian Navy in conjunction with the Foreign
Ministry also commented on the forging of documents, including a certificate ostensibly issued by
the Peruvian naval attache at the embassy in Washington. The signature of Rear Admiral Julio de los
Rios was forged, for example, making it appear erroneously as if he were the naval attache. There
was a Peruvian connection uncovered in Washington, DC, however, and reported by CARETAS on
Oct. 6. Raul Sanchez Sotomayor, the Peruvian representative before the Inter-American Defense
Board in Washington, had been involved since 1984 in business dealings with Duncan Davis
companies. In August, the Peruvian Senate established a multi-party investigative Commission.
Other governments, would-be- governments, and assorted racketeers have commented on the
affair in accordance with their interests, their information, or their imaginations. Jensen, owner
of the Danish shipping company, claimed to know nothing of the case. At any rate, he had other
things on his mind, as he, along with two of his captains and two of his shipping brokers, had been
charged by Danish authorities with breaking a United Nations embargo on arms sales to South
Africa. Salvadoran Vice President and Foreign Minister Rodolfo Castillo Claramount echoed Gen.
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Blandon's denial of official Salvadoran involvement. Alfonso Robelo of the United Nicaraguan
Opposition (UNO), interviewed by Colombia's RADIO CARACOL, said the Pia Vesta's cargo was
destined for leftist guerrillas in Peru or Colombia. On June 21, the TIMES of London cited US official
sources as claiming that the weapons were intended for Peruvian guerrillas. Managua's RADIO
SANDINO reported June 18 that a "CIA vessel, carrying weapons for the Somocista mercenaries,
has been seized by Panamanian authorities...A year ago, another CIA-owned Danish-flag ship was
detained in Costa Rica." RADIO VENCEREMOS, speaking for the Salvadoran guerrillas, said that
Gen. Blandon had organized a network in El Salvador with the objective of transferring the weapons
to the contras. It claimed that the shipment was valued at $11 million. The Panamanian military used
the seizure of the Pia Vesta as occasion for a parade to "reaffirm national sovereignty." The parade
featured a display of the confiscated trucks and weapons. Among the most interesting responses to
the Pia Vesta caper was that of Cuban President Fidel Castro. In a July 1 interview on Panamanian
television station, Panavision, he noted that the leaks in the NEW YORK TIMES the previous
month concerning the crimes of Panamanian Gen. Noriega drugs and arms trafficking, money
laundering, spying for both the US and Cuba came from the US State Department, the Pentagon,
and intelligence and White House sources. Those leaks coincided with Noriega's undertaking to
intercept the Pia Vesta. Castro expressed the belief that the leaks had been orchestrated by someone
at the National Security Council in a timely effort to discredit Noriega. One of the many questions
about the Pia Vesta caper that continue to baffle investigators is that of a missing person. When the
ship departed its East German port, there were eight persons on board; when it was intercepted
in Panamanian waters, there were only seven. In a more innocent and reasonable world, some
of the conclusions that the Pia Vesta affair suggested would seem most improbable. One of the
improbables, however, that of the contras being provisioned, like their Sandinista adversaries,
with arms from the Soviet bloc was shown to be fact when the US-made C-129 military transport
plane carrying Eugene Hasenfus and two less fortunate Americans was shot down over Nicaraguan
territory in early October. Among the supplies carried in that C-129 was ammunition for the Sovietmade 82-KF automatic rifle, a rifle found aboard the Pia Vesta. [Prof. Valdes teaches sociology at the
University of New Mexico, and is director of the LADB. Jan Knippers Black teaches political science
at UNM, and is a leader of the Democratic Party's progressive wing in New Mexico.]
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